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EXPLAINING DIFFUSE SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: AN ASSESSMENT OF FOUR MODELS*
Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus
Introduction
Constitutional courts, such as the Supreme Courts of Canada, India, Ireland,
Japan, and the United States, the High Court of Australia, and the Constitutional Court of West Germany, perform several politically relevant roles. Among
these are interpreting and applying rules, defining boundaries of political authority, supervising lower courts, legislating, representing, legitimating controversial
public policies, stabilizing political institutions, and educating.' Students of the
judicial process have long assumed that the effectiveness of a constitutional court
in playing its several roles depends in good measure on how it is viewed by elite
and mass publics. Hence, they have expressed sensitivity to the need for assessing
public opinion when analyzing both the options open to a court and the consequences resulting from judicial behavior.2
One indicator of how the public views a court is the generalized affection
which Easton has termed diffuse support.' No governmental institution could
long survive if support for it depended entirely on the immediate gratification of
demands. There are simply too many competing demands; processes are too
slow; resources are too limited. In diffuse support, whatever its wellsprings, lies
the reservoir of good will that helps an institution cope with frustrations caused by
unsatisfied demands.
To gauge diffuse support in a national population survey in 1966 and in
subsequent elite surveys of lawyers, college students, and administrative assistants
to United States Senators and Congressmen, we posed a battery of general queries
that called upon respondents to assess the Supreme Court's competence, impartiality, avoidance of partisan politics, and trustworthiness as compared to
the Congress.' Various research reports, some as yet unpublished, present our
analysis of the data developed in these surveys and our evaluation of alternative
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models for explaining variations in diffuse support for the Court. This article
summarizes our assessment of four of the more interesting models.5
I. Diffuse Support for the Court as a Function of Partisan Allegiance
Robert Dahl has argued that, because American presidents have frequent
opportunities to nominate new justices, the United States Supreme Court is likely
to be an integral part of the ruling coalition that controls the White House and
attempts to run the Congress.6 Thus, one explanation of patterns of support for
the Court asserts that citizens tend to perceive the Court as Dahl pictures it
(albeit without either Dahl's clarity or sophistication), and predicts that when
Democrats are in power in Washington, Democrats will be more pro-Court than
Republicans; and when Republicans are in power, their adherents will be more
supportive of the Court than will Democrats. If this general explanation is true,
then the following proposition should have held in 1966: Democrats should
have been much more supportive than Republicans.
A. Test

One widely used measure of partisan allegiance is party identification as
scaled by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (SRC).' When
the relationship between a factor scale of diffuse support and party identification
was plotted, the results were in the direction predicted. Democrats proportionately outnumbered Republicans at the favorable end of the support continuum,
and Republicans proportionately outnumbered Democrats at the critical end.
The Pearson product-moment correlation (r) between diffuse support and party
identification, however, was only .20.
We also constructed another measure of party allegiance, a factor index
with heavy loadings on both SRC's party identification scale and a scale based
on respondents' recollections of their presidential vote (or voting preference) in
1964. The linkage between partisanship so defined and support for the Court
improved somewhat (r = .28), but remained far from impressive.
It seemed plausible to suppose that part of the reason why neither party
identification nor partisanship could account for more support lies in the complicated nature of the party system itself. As it turned out, white Southerners who
called themselves Democrats evidenced much less support than did non-Southern
Democrats and somewhat less support than did Republicans outside the South.
Dropping white Southerners from the sample increased slightly the ability of
partisanship to account for support; but even when analysis was confined to nonsoutherners with a demonstrable awareness of at least one decision area in which
5
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the Court had been active, the correlation between diffuse support and partisanship did not exceed .35.
B. Conclusion
Although support for the Court did vary to some extent with party allegiance, party allegiance cannot, standing alone, take us more than a small step
toward understanding the bases of diffuse support.
II. Diffuse Support for the Court as a Function of Knowledge About It
Defenders of the Court, and sometimes the justices themselves, have often
caustically noted the uninformed character of much of the criticism (and critics)
of the Court. The implication of such laments is that if people would only take
time and effort to understand the way the Court operates, they would be far less
critical. In sum, the argument is that to know the Court is to respect it, if not
to love it. If differences in degree of knowledge can account for variations in
support, then the following proposition should have held: Respondents who
were better informed about the Court should also have been more supportive
than respondents who were less well informed.
A. Test
To measure knowledge about the Court we constructed a factor scale whose
heaviest loadings resulted from responses to a battery of open-ended queries about
four subjects. These were information about (1) the Court's functions, (2) the
names of sitting members, (a) decision areas in which the Court had been active
in recent years, and (4) efforts to alter the Court or its membership. The correlation between that index and diffuse support for the sample as a whole was not
only low, but actually inverse: r = -. 13. For selected groups, on the other hand,
the relationship between diffuse support and knowledge was quite another matter.
For southern whites r = .33, and for blacks r = .49. Moreover, Pearson's r did
not adequately describe the relationship between Court knowledge and support
for either group. Take, for example, the 96 blacks for whom we could compute
diffuse support scores. When their scale scores for support were plotted against
knowledge, the relationship proved to be curvilinear. Support for the Court
expressed by those blacks who had a very meager knowledge of it, although
largely positive, varied over a fairly wide range. Only a modest knowledge of
the Court, however, was necessary to make the black man its staunch supporter.
Not only did increments in Court knowledge result in sharp increments in diffuse
support, but Court knowledge also quickly attained a level at which diffuse support, as measured by our crude scale, is maximal. The relationship may be
described as
Diffuse support = 2.41 - .24 Court Knowlege +
3.77 log10 Court Knowledge
and accounts for more than twice as much variance (51% ) as linear regression.
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The pattern for southern whites was also curvilinear but more complex. As
in the case of blacks, southern whites with little knowledge of the Court were
generally supportive of it. As the level of knowledge increased, the support level
for some southern whites also increased; but for the large majority as knowledge
increased, diffuse support sharply declined.
B. Conclusion
The results of these tests did not support the hypothesized proposition; i.e.,
respondents who were better informed about the Court should also have been
more supportive than respondents who were less well informed. Close analysis,
of the black and southern white respondents suggested that knowledge might
provide a more powerful explanation for variations in diffuse support if (a)
the evaluative (intensity) dimensions of the respondents' Court knowledge could
also be taken into account, and (b) a more sensitive measure of diffuse support
could be constructed.'
III. Diffuse Support for the Court as a Function of How the Court Is
Evaluated as a Policy-maker
Another explanation for variations in support holds that evaluations of the
Court are largely functions of preferences among public policies. Those people
who agree with the implications of the Court's jurisprudence for practical policies will esteem the Court more highly than those who are neutral toward such
policies and much more highly than those who are opposed to the political implications of the Court's work. Without question, the decisions of the Court
for at least a decade prior to the survey in 1966 had been quite liberal. Thus
if the characterization of support as essentially instrumental and pragmatic is
valid, then:
1. Respondents who approved the particular decisions of the Court
should have been more supportive than those who were neutral and
much more supportive than those who were opposed to the rulings.
2. Of the respondents able to evaluate particular Court policies,
those whose basic political outlook was more congruent with the liberal
trend of decisions of the Court should have been much more supportive
than those whose outlook was opposed to that trend.
A. Test
The instrument we used to measure evaluations of recent actions of the
Court was a policy scale constructed by summing answers to open-ended queries
about recent Court decisions that respondents had liked or disliked. Slightly
8 For a preliminary report on the use of psychophysical scaling techniques in building a
more sensitive measure of diffuse support, see J. Tanenhaus, W. Murphy, B. Tursky, & M.
Lodge, Diffuse Support for Constitutional Courts: A Methodological Analysis (mimeo 1973).
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less than half of the participants in the 1966 survey (46%) pointed to a policy
area in which the Court had been active; we could compute both Court policy
and diffuse support scores for only 590 respondents.
1. Diffuse support and evaluations of recent actions of the Court.
The correlation between diffuse and Court policy scores for the 590 respondents was .53, a sizable relationship for a pair of survey research variables. For
specialized groups the correlation can be even larger. Using identical scaling
procedures with an elite sample of 181 administrative assistants to U.S. Senators
and Congressmen, we obtained a correlation of .74. These correlations might
seem to confirm the hypothesized relationship rather neatly; but correlations
can sometimes obscure as much as they reveal. That is what happened here.
Those who stood higher on the specific scale did, to be sure, tend to have higher
diffuse scores than did respondents who scored lower on the Court policy scale.
Nevertheless, a substantial minority of those who were negative on the scale of
Court policy still registered positive scores on the diffuse scale. Indeed, only a
little more than half of those who voiced negative policy scores were also unsupportive on the diffuse scale. The hypothesized explanation for variations in diffuse support did not anticipate this phenomenon.
2. Diffuse support and general political outlook.
In measuring general political outlook we used a "liberalism/conservatism"
index. For the 590 respondents who knew at least something about the Court's
recent decisions, the association between diffuse support and liberalism/conservatism was strong and positive r = .55. For the special elite sample of
administrative assistants, Pearson's r soared to .80. When the explanatory power
of the liberalism/conservatism and Court policy scales were combined, they
yielded multiple correlations of .62 for the 590 survey respondents and .84 for
the special elite sample.
B. Conclusion
The third of the hypothesized explanations (i.e., diffuse support for the
Court as a function of how the Court is evaluated as a policy-maker) has much
to commend it; nevertheless, it cannot serve as a satisfactory general explanation
for variations in diffuse support. The model cannot explain the striking phenomenon already noted that a substantial minority of those who were negative on
the scale of Court policy registered positive scores on the diffuse scale. Another,
and perhaps more glaring, deficiency of the model is its inability to tell us anything about the level of diffuse support of the 54 per cent of the population unfamiliar with the Court's policy outputs.
IV. Diffuse Support for the Court as a Function of Attitude Toward the Court:
A Learning Theory Model
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Although variously defined, the term "attitude" generally designates a construct with two principal components-the cognitive (beliefs about an object)
and the evaluative (intensity of feeling about the beliefs that make up the cognitive component).' An attitude is relatively stable and tends to shape an individual's behavioral responses, both verbal and nonverbal, to external stimuli.
According to our learning theory model, diffuse support for the Court, as verbalized response, is a function of attitudes that were conditioned early in life and
perhaps modified by later learning.'" Research in political socialization has
revealed that by the time children reach 8 or 9 years of age they tend to perceive
political institutions in a manner that is highly favorable though cognitively rather
vague." Data on the child's attitude toward the Supreme Court in particular
show that he holds the Court in very high esteem. 2 Subsequent learning can
alter attitudes toward the Court. Learning about Supreme Court activity in an
area about which a person felt very strongly, civil rights or schoolhouse religion,
for example, would be expected to affect his attitude toward the Court.
If the learning-theory explanation for diffuse support is sound, then the
following propositions should hold:
1. If a person's attitude toward the Court had
childhood, his responses to diffuse support items in
been favorable to the Court.
2. The more favorable a respondent's attitude
(as modified by subsequent learning) was, the higher
score should have been.

not changed since
1966 should have
toward the Court
his diffuse support

A. Test
A rigorous test of these propositions requires longitudinal data.' Unfortunately, they do not yet exist, and we must do what we can with data from a
single point in time.
1. Diffuse support when attitudes had not changed since childhood.
The learning theory model goes a fair way toward accounting for the responses of a large subset of people (25 per cent of the national sample) for whom
alternative models do not begin to cope. This group consists of people who could
discriminate the Supreme Court from other governmental institutions but could
See McGuire, The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change, in 3 THE HANDSOoI OF
142-157 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson ed. 1969); ATTITUDE MEASUREMENT
(G. Summers ed. 1970); M. Smith, Attitude Change, in I INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 458 (1968).
10 See the contributions by Doob, Fishbein, Lott, and Rhine in READINGS IN ATTITUDE
THEORY AND MEASUREMENT (M. Fishbein ed. 1967).
11 D. EASTON & J. DENNIS, CHILDREN IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (1969); R. HESS & J.
TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN (1967); LEARNING
ABOUT POLITICS. A READER IN POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (R. Sigel ed. 1970).
12 EASTON & DENNIS, supra note 11, at 243-286.
13 We hope to develop such data in 1975 by reinterviewing respondents to the 1966
survey.
9
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not point to anything that the Court had done in recent years. If we may assume,
therefore, that the early attitudes of these respondents had not been modified,
it should follow that their responses to diffuse items should have been favorable
to the Court. That this was in fact the case is most effectively illustrated by their

answers to the following pair of queries: (a) How well does the Court do its job?
(b) Do you think that in its decisions the Supreme Court favors any particular
group or groups in this country? Answers critical of the Court comprised only
8.6 per cent of the responses to the first question, and 11.3 per cent of the responses to the second.
2. The association between diffuse support and attitude as modified by
subsequent learning.
To measure attitude toward the Court, as modified by subsequent learning,
we resorted once again to the battery of open-ended questions about recent
Court decisions. By treating each reference to a Court action as a cognitive
element and whether a respondent liked or disliked each action he mentioned as
an indicator of intensity, we built a summated scale to serve as a surrogate for
attitude.1 4 This measure is extremely inelegant because (a) no weight is given
to early learning, (b) major cognitive elements may be missing for some respondents, (c) the intensity of each cognitive element is but crudely represented, and
(d) only 46 per cent of the respondents to the national sample mentioned even
a single action of the Court.
Despite these inadequacies, when all respondents in the national survey for
whom both diffuse support and attitude scores could be computed are included
(N = 590), the correlation between the two variables is .53. Presumably the
strength of the association would increase if the intensity of one or more cognitive
elements could be measured more sensitively. We can test this expectation for
those respondents (N = 295) who included decisions regarding civil rights
among the Court decisions mentioned because we also have factor scores for
them based on their answers to a battery of four questions about their feelings
toward civil rights. When intensity as measured by this more sensitive scale is
taken into account, the correlation between diffuse support and attitude rises
to .66.
Moreover, since the surrogate for attitude, as modified by subsequent learning, made no provision for the residue of early learning, the favorability of attitude toward the Court has been underestimated, perhaps seriously. This would
not, of course, lead one to anticipate dissonance between diffuse and attitude
scores when the latter were positive; i.e, whenever the score on the attitude scale
was favorable, the score on the diffuse support scale should also have been favorable. On the other hand, one should expect to find many respondents with
slightly to moderately negative scores on our crude measure of attitude whose
diffuse support scores reflected confidence in the Court. The data in Table 1
reveal how strikingly these expectations are confirmed.
14 As operationalized for present purposes, the surrogate for attitude and the Court policy
scale are identical.
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TABLE 1
CROSSTABULATION OF ATTITUDE AND DIFFUSE SUPPORT SCORES:
SRC'S 1966 POST-ELECTION SURVEY
(in percentages)
Attitude Scale (Summated)
-neutral
+
++
+ ++
Diffuse
(2)
(1)
(4)
(3)
(6)
(5)
Scale (Likert Type) (7)
Strongly Positive
(4.1 - 5.0)
Positive
'(3.1 - 4.0)
Neutral
(3.0)
Negative
(2.9 - 2.0)
Strongly Negative
(1.9- 1.0)

10%

75%

59%

63%

35%

25%

10%

25

38

21

31

21

14

8

3

6

5

10

5

5

6

15

16

20

13

4

14

29

51

64

100%
(N=90)

100%
(N=65)

-

100%
(N=4)

100%
(N=29)

100%
100%
(N=242) (N=121)

100%
(N=39)

With very few exceptions, people who commented favorably on the Court's
policy outputs (those with attitude scores of 5, 6, and 7) also responded favorably
to generalized queries about the Court. The converse was not true. Of those
respondents with moderately negative attitude scores (score category 3), slightly
more had positive than negative scores for diffuse support. Moreover, even a
quarter of those with moderately negative attitude scores (score category 6), and
more-than one-sixth of those with very negative attitude scores (score category 1),
fell on the positive side of the diffuse scale. All in all, less than half of those
with negative scores for attitude also had diffuse scores critical of the Court.
B. Conclusion
The learning theory model is potentially the most rewarding of the four
explanations for diffuse support here considered. More rigorous testing with
longitudinal data is essential, however, before the learning theory model can be
accepted as a valid explanation for variations in diffuse support.

